\u3ci\u3eNo Contest: Corporate Lawyers and the Perversion of Justice in America\u3c/i\u3e by Branson, Douglas M.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 48 | Issue 2
1998
No Contest: Corporate Lawyers and the Perversion of
Justice in America
Douglas M. Branson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Douglas M. Branson, No Contest: Corporate Lawyers and the Perversion of Justice in America, 48 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 459 (1998)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol48/iss2/10
BOOK REVIEW
No CoNTEsT: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA
BY RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH
NEW YORK: RANDOM HOUSE
PP. xxvim - 427. $25.95
Reviewed by Douglas M. Bransont
This is not a book about corporate lawyers, at least as lawyers
use that term. This is a book about lawyers corporations hire-trial
lawyers mainly-and their use of litigation tactics that subvert
justice.'
No Contest is a typical muckraking Nader book. That is to
say, as with previous books by Nader and co-authors,2 Messrs.
Nader and Smith espouse a number of one sided and alarmist
views on many subjects. Frequently, their prose waxes histrionic:
Corporate lawyers "are now on missions of taking away, generical-
ly, the rights and remedies of people... so they do not have a
t W. Edward Sell Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
'" The only exception may be the passage describing the machinations of the Skadden
Arps law firm leading to replacement of Justice Andrew Moore on the Delaware Supreme
Court. See RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No ComST. CORPORATE LAWYERS AND
THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 207-11 (1996) ("Seeking Justice in Delaware").
2 See, e.g., RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SM1m, COLLISION COURSE: THE TRUTH
ABotrr AIRINE SAFETY (1993); RALPH NADER Er AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976); RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
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chance to plead for justice."3 In Nader's view, he and Smith have
successfully described "[tihe degrading role of the corporate attor-
ney as a clever hired hand supinely following orders so long as the
big checks keep flowing..'4 Come on!5
The book also contains outdated and recycled material, insert-
ed to bulk up the volume. The two authors also describe as fail-
ures of the legal system what are in reality imperfections that
judges and legislators have attempted to put right, albeit often on a
belated basis.
Those faults delineated, to be amplified later, No Contest does
describe the "winning is everything" mentality that today infects
litigation. The view of many lawyers that the end justifies the
means leads to secret settlements and confidentiality agreements
designed to delay or suppress justice in subsequent cases involving,
for example, the same defective product; discovery abuse and
stonewalling for no purpose other than to deplete plaintiffs' re-
sources and enlarge the defense firm's billable time; spoliation
(destruction or defacement) of evidence in the name of zealous
advocacy; or bullying tactics epitomized by the Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation (SLAPP), designed to deflate or de-
stroy activists who challenge large corporations' agendas. Anyone
who does a significant amount of trial work encounters these litiga-
tion abuses, but not only in cases in which the defendant is a large
corporation. These abuses infect the entire civil justice system.
They may be no more than symptomatic of an attitude pandemic in
the society of which the civil justice system is a part.
I. HALF-TRUTHS AND ONE-SIDED VIEWS
Nader and Smith write a book that condemns the practice
which is endemic in a certain segment of the bar-that populated
by powerful, large law firm lawyers who attended the nation's elite
law schools. Nader and Smith then project that condemnation over
the entire profession, or a large portion of it. The very beginning
. NADER & SMrrH, supra note 1, at 359.
See id.
For other expressions of Nader's and Smith's opinions of corporate attorneys, see
also M. at xxi (condemning the "raw mercantilist ethic so prevalent in today's modem
corporate law culture"), id. at xxiv (characterizing corporate lawyers as "masterminds of
choreographing contests that are, in fact, no contest at all"), or id. at 357 (claiming to
have catalogued "the oppressive conduct of many corporate attorneys and their unsavory
tactics").
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of the book recounts the twenty-fifth reunion of the Harvard Law
class of 1970. One alumna, a partner in a large law firm, wonders
about spending her professional life "making rich people richer."6
Nader and Smith base their examination of the nation's system
of legal education upon observations gleaned at Harvard, and also
at Columbia. They find that at these places "faculty members are
often too busy with their moonlighting business consultantships" to
engage in advocacy for reform of the civil justice system.7 In part
fueled by professors' headlong pursuit of lucre, "the law school
environment, taken as a whole, [becomes] awash in cynical apathy
or commercialism."8 In United States law schools, then, "the ma-
jority of the lights at the end of the law school tunnel are those
that flicker from the luxurious office buildings of corporate law
practices."9
Colorful prose-but not representative of what most lawyers
do in corporate law firms, or of the nation's other 170 accredited
law schools (or, probably, of Harvard and Columbia). Most lawyers
in a business practice are engaged in helping distinctly middle class
clients organize the affairs of small and medium size businesses.
They advise on minimization of taxes, compliance with labor and
employment security laws, occupational health and safety issues,
and similar questions. And that is even true of much of the prac-
tice in large big-city law firms. The experiences of the Harvard
Law class of 1970 are simply not representative of 99.9 percent of
the profession. Thus, Nader and Smith never demonstrate that they
are even aware of what most "corporate lawyers" do.
Nader and Smith also seem not to have been near a law
school--or at least an ordinary mortal one-in many a year. Law
graduates and students are fighting to survive the seventh consecu-
tive year of a hiring drought. Large law firms are hiring at one-
quarter or one-fifth the pace at which they hired in the mid-eight-
ies. Predictions are that the practice of law will never return to the
generous staffing levels that characterized it a decade ago. Corpo-
rate clients will no longer put up with the billing and staffing
practices which characterized that earlier era. Therefore, students
are scrambling for jobs.
6,Id. at xiii.
" Id. at 336 (discussing the failure of law schools to provide students with opportu-
nities positively to change legal practice).
Id. at 337.
. Id. at 335.
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Historically, and today, at most "real" law schools, only a
small minority of students aspire to a corporate practice. Students
are also interested in environmental and land use law, public and
private international law, criminal prosecution or defense, alterna-
tive dispute resolution, or small firm litigation practice involving
large doses of personal injury plaintiff and defense work. A few
third year students still harbor an idealistic hope to earn a living
litigating the pressing constitutional issues of the day, or doing
death row appeals. Furthermore, while students have downscaled
their aspirations on a widespread basis, the one aspirational seg-
ment that does not seem to have suffered is the idealistic, a signifi-
cant group of law students who, I would venture to say, outnumber
the business practice aspirants.
As for the faculty, on a representative faculty of 30 or so
members, only three, four or perhaps five may consult on a regular
basis. Moreover, most law schools have seen a pronounced amplifi-
cation of public law offerings, and for teachers of those offerings,
consulting opportunities are rare. In viewing those law faculty who
do consult, I have not seen a faculty member exceed the "no more
than one day per week" in consulting that prevails everywhere in
legal academe. Most do less.
Among other non-representative views are Nader and Smith's
failure to acknowledge even awareness that plaintiffs' attorneys,
too, engage in some of the practices they condemn. Plaintiffs
stonewall in discovery from time to time. e Plaintiffs engage in
fishing trips. Plaintiffs have been known to attempt to "conflict
out" expert witnesses readily available on an issue."
I do not expect a Nader book to achieve balance. And my
personal sympathies lie with plaintiffs and against large corpora-
tions and the "Crush-em, Bash-em and Sanction-em" law firms that
tend to represent them. Nonetheless, this book would gain im-
"* See, e.g., Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.,
602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (for three years plaintiff failed to submit meaningful an-
swers to interrogatories).
"- Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, only upon "a showing of exceptional
circumstances" may a defendant obtain the names of, much less use, experts plaintiff has
consulted or retained but who will not testify at trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B); see
also Kuster v. Harer, 109 F.R.D. 372, 375 (D. Minn. 1986) (ruling that the defendants
could not discover list of medical experts who plaintiff consulted, but who would not
testify at trial); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Clow Corp., 108 F.R.D. 304,
311 (D.P.R. 1985) (ruling that the defendant corporations could not discover the identities
of numerous non-testifying experts retained by plaintiff).
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mensely in credibility if from time to time it noted that another
side exists.
II. RECYCLED AND FiLER MATERIAL
Richard Nixon always returned to his shining moment of
redemption, the Checkers speech of 1956. So does Ralph Nader. At
no less than three points, No Contest recounts episodes in the
Chevrolet Corvair pratfall that first brought Ralph Nader into the
national limelight. 3 The authors even devote a few pages to the
Ford Pinto litigation of the early 1970s.' 4 These scandals are de-
cades old. One suspects that Nader and Smith could not find
enough current incriminating material to fill a book.
They also bulk up the book by recounting episodes to which
the reaction should be "so what?" For example, in "The Case of
the Pampered Utility," they seem scandalized that "in the summer
of 1988, [Commonwealth] Edison crews had used water from city
fire hydrants to cool down overheated electrical equipment."'" Per-
sonally, if by doing so Edison averted damage to persons or prop-
erty, I do not care if Edison employees used city water, or holy
water. And I doubt that anyone else would either.
Such filler material simply does not jibe with the
introduction's preview of the pages to follow: "This book strives to
demonstrate how power lawyers can harm innocent and vulnerable
people and undermine the rule of law. What we describe is not
rare [then why dig up the Corvair three times?]; it is conduct all
too representative of many corporate attorneys."'"
Ill. EXCESsIVE ALARMISM
This book catalogues what allegedly are failures of the civil
justice system only to reveal in ensuing pages that the plaintiff was
vindicated after all, or that the defense lawyer ultimately was sanc-
tioned for his conduct, or that courts or legislatures are enacting
2, See, e.g., NADER & SMrrH, supra note 1, at 88-89, 147-48, 206 (recounting Gener-
al Motors' attempts to cover up the design defect inherent in the Corvair direct air heat-
ing system as well as its lack of stability on the rad).
'" Ralph Nader's book UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED, featuring the Chevrolet Corvair, ap-
peared in 1965. See NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED, supra note 2.
'4 NADER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 70-72 (noting the significant number of deaths
and injuries resulting from the Pinto, and the Ford Co.'s belated recall of the cars).
" Id. at 74.
' Id. at xxvii.
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rules or statutes in an attempt to eradicate the abusive tactic de-
scribed. In fact, just about every episode the book recounts ulti-
mately does have a favorable outcome. At most, then, what Nader
and Smith describe are imperfections-often serious imperfections,
but not complete failures of the civil justice system.
Thus, for example, Charles Keating did defraud many Lincoln
Savings depositors by convincing them to divert their dollars into
bonds issued by the parent American Continental Corporation
(ACC), which later collapsed. However, Charles Keating did sever-
al years in a federal penitentiary, 7 and the law firms that repre-
sented ACC and Lincoln, Kaye Scholer and Jones, Day, paid gar-
gantuan fines."s
The book chronicles abuses in sealing court files after a corpo-
ration has lost an important case, in confidentiality agreements
extracted as part of the settlement process to forestall information
sharing by plaintiffs' attorneys, and in vacatur of judgments in
return for immediate payment, thus robbing adjudicated proceedings
of precedential effect. 9 Late in the chapter, after Nader and Smith
have gotten the reader agitated about these practices, they reveal
that the Texas Supreme Court has enacted a rule requiring most
court files to remain unsealed.' Similarly, Idaho, Georgia, Michi-
gan and Delaware have open file court rules.2 ' Indeed, recent
years have witnessed several state initiatives aimed at preventing
secrecy in court files. For example, Florida enacted a "Sunshine in
Litigation Act" in 1990, Washington adopted substantially similar
legislation in 1993, titled "The Public Right to Know Bill," and
Louisiana followed Florida and Washington in 1995.' Finally,
7 See Adam Zagorin, Charles Keating, Demon of the $500 Billion S & L Fiasco, Is
Now Innocent, Sort Of, TME, Feb. 3, 1997, at 36 (detailing the overtuming of Keating's
wire and securities fraud conviction after he had served 41h years of a 12 year sentence);
Conviction Out in Keating Trial, NEWSDAY, Dec. 3, 1996, at A16.
" Kaye Scholer paid a $41 million fine, although the Office of Thrift Supervision
sought $275 million, and a further $63 million in settlement of private suits, and Jones,
Day paid a $51 million fine. See, e.g., Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings
and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 53; David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count:
Regulating Lawyers After Kaye Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1214 n.279 (1993).
19. See, e.g., NADER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 61 ("[A] parent may buy a child car
safety seat unaware that other children have been severely injured or killed in that mod-
el .... A secret settlement may have swept the potential danger under the rug."); id. at
66 ("[S]ecrecy orders delay justice, increase the costs of litigation, and create a cynical
'catch me if you can' system of discovery.").
x See id. at 95.
21. See id. at 96.
'2- See id. at 96-97.
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some local courts around the country have acted similarly.'s
Judges have done likewise. When the government of the Philip-
pines sued Westinghouse for allegedly having bribed Ferdinand
Marcos to obtain favorable nuclear power contracts, Federal District
Judge Dickinson Debevoise refused to seal the court file.24 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.'
Sitting in Birmingham, Alabama, Federal District Judge Sam C.
Pointer, Jr. signed an order prohibiting confidentiality clauses in
agreements settling breast implant cases.'
In a chapter dealing with the intimidating, bullying SLAPP
tactic," the authors explain how SLAPPed farmers who were sued
for opposing an agribusiness corporation over a water rights mea-
sure ultimately were paid $15 million in actual and punitive dam-
agess An attorney who took on Shell Oil over resins used in
plastic pipes got SLAPPed, but SLAPPed back with a lawsuit of
his own, recovering $7.6 million from Shell.29 Nine states have
enacted anti-SLAPP statutes, 0 and two Denver University law
professors, Rock Pring and Penelope Canan, have promulgated a
model statute for adoption by other states.31 There always will be
bullies, in litigation and in the society at large just as much as on
the playground. But together judges and legislators have recognized
the chilling effect of the SLAPP suit and are doing something
about it.
A later passage alarms the reader with sections entitled "Crush-
2 See id. (mentioning the Superior Court in San Diego County, California).
U See Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 139 F.R.D. 50
(D.NJ. 1991).
2' See Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653 (3d
Cir. 1991).
' See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, No. CV 92-P-
10000-S, CIV.A.CV94-P-11558-S, MDL 926, 1994 WL 114580 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1994)
(approving mentor class); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation,
No. CV 93-P-11433-S, CV 92-P-10000-S, 1993 WL 795477 (N.D. Ala. June 2, 1993)
(ruling on notice and other matters).
2 See NADER & SMrrH, supra note 1, at 158-92 ("SLAPP: Taking Care of Busi-
ness").
2 See id at 171.
2" See Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co., 216 Cal. App. 3d 547 (3d Dist. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 98 U.S. 919 (1990).
' NADER & SMrTH, supra note 1, at 180 (listing California, Delaware, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington).
"" See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: GETnNG SUED FOR SPEAKING
OuT 201-07 (1996) (suggesting a "Model Anti-SLAPP Bill," which would be cited as the
"Citizen Participation in Government Act of 199U").
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ing the Ethical Whistle-Blowers,"32 followed by another alarming
section entitled "Harassing the Whistle Blowers." '3 3 Only on the
chapter's last page do Nader and Smith tell the reader that thirty
five states have now enacted legislation to protect whistle blowers
against the practices they earlier described.'
As with the insertion of "filler" material in the book, with their
excessive alarmism, Nader and Smith rob their work of credibility.
Citizens, plaintiffs mainly, do suffer anguish and anxiety because
of the abusive litigation tactics Nader and Smith describe, but quite
frequently those citizens achieve ultimate vindication. The civil
justice system is not, then, as one-sided as Nader and Smith would
have us believe.
IV. DEMONIZING CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
Among others, populists of the 1880s and 1890s35 and dema-
gogues through the ages (Huey Long, for example)' have rallied
citizens to their cause by demonizing large corporations.
Demonizing corporations has been a favorite Nader theme for
decades, harking back to his 1970s campaign for federal chartering
of large publicly held corporations.' Nader and Smith return to
that theme in this volume. They bemoan:
The big-business imperative, driven by the petrochemical,
automobile, oil, steel, tobacco, drug, insurance, banking,
real estate, agribusiness, genetic-engineering, telecommuni-
cations, nuclear, foodprocessing, and other industries....
Corporations have spent a great deal of time, effort, and
money establishing privileges and immunities, through their
See NADER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 218-22.
" See id. at 222-31.
3 See id at 231.
' The populists had "seared into their memory images that would last a generation,
images of the arrogant power of giant corporations backed by the military might of the
state.. . ." ROBERT C. McMATH, JR., AMERICAN POPULISM: A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1877-
1898, at 4 (1993).
'6 In his Louisiana gubernatorial campaigns, Huey Long built for himself the image
of "the man who knew how to handle the big corporations"; in every speech attacked
"the New Orleans press and the corporations"; and in particular demonized the Standard
Oil Company as "an arrogant corporate power" favoring "'the Crescent [by imports of
Turkish oil] over the children of Moses."' T. HARRY WnIIAms, HuEY LONG 180, 203-04
(1969).
37 See RALPH NADER ET AL., CONSTrTUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE
FOR GENERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976); NADAR Er AL., TAMING THE
GIANT CORPORATION, supra note 2.
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attorneys, that real people do not possess, thus creating
uneven playing fields that allow corporations to maneuver
and dominate in a way that individuals never could?
In this book, Nader and Smith add a new dimension: they
demonize individuals as well. Washington, D.C. super lawyer
Lloyd Cutler is "a genius, but an evil genius."'39 Late in the
book,' ten pages lambast the special prosecutor who would be
dean,4 Kenneth Starr. Nader and Smith criticize Starr for whom
he represents, including General Motors in the side-saddle pickup
truck fuel tank litigation42 and well-known corporate bandit Victor
Posner, against whom the Second Circuit affirmed a lifetime ban
on involvement in the affairs of a publicly held corporation.43
They excoriate Starr further for refusing to take a leave of absence
from super law firm Kirkland and Ellis, continuing to represent
clients while acting as special prosecutor even though all predeces-
sors in that office have resigned from or taken a leave from their
permanent employment positions."
Many corporations and some individuals demonized by Nader
and Smith do, indeed, deserve to be demonized. The difficulty,
however, is the prescription to which demonization inevitably leads.
V. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
For all its filler material, half-truth and excessive alarmism, No
Contest is a good read. I read it almost non-stop, on two airplane
flights and in one long airport layover. There are ills in the civil
' NADER & SMITH, supra note 1, at xvi-xviii.
39 ld. at 13.
4 See i&L at 320-29.
", Compare Charles Zehren, Kenneth Starr to Take Academic Post, NEWSDAY, Feb.
18, 1997, at A4 (reporting that Starr was to become dean of Pepperdine University Law
School and director of the newly founded Public Policy Institute), with James Toedtman,
Starr's Back: He Rejoins Whitewater Probe, NEwSDAY, Feb. 22, 1997, at A3 (reporting
the withdrawal of the announcement that Starr would join the Pepperdine faculty on Au-
gust 1, 1997).
" See NADER & SMnI, supra note 1, at 323.
In Posner v. SEC, 16 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1077
(1995), the court upheld "eternal boardroom banishment' for corporate looter Posner and
his son. While special prosecutor, Starr also represented Posner in his petition for a writ
of certiorari to the Second Circuilt. See NADER & SMrIH, supra note 1, at 324.
4 See NADER & SMnrH, supra note 1, at 327 (stating that Starr's "indifference to
[his] multiconflicting status and its ethical ramifications-while being hailed as a person
of integrity and a key counselor to leading corporations-threatened to further erode al-
ready crumbling standards of propriety for the profession").
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justice system.45 Many of them are attributable to the "winning
justifies everything" attitude prevalent among attorneys. Many attor-
neys engage in abuse of the system while representing resource-
rich large corporations against individuals and smaller law firms.
Lastly, many of those attorneys seem to be of the pin-striped vari-
ety that populate the confederacy of three or four large law firms
that dominate most American cities. City by city these confedera-
cies have come to have a comer on representation of large publicly
held corporations.'
The difficulty with demonization of those and the corporations
they represent is that development of the subject in that manner
leads to calls for punishment, retribution, and increased regulation.
That is where Nader and Smith take us. Law firms should be
punished for the litigation tactics of their members: "To do less is
to permit law firm managers to countenance the ethical indiffer-
ence, if not outright ethical and criminal violations, occurring in
the practice of corporate law today."'47
Too much punishment, however, is antithetical to the aims of
the civil justice system. The civil justice system removes disputes
from the level of the streets to a more rarefied intellectual plane.
' Those ills persist despite the commands of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
for the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994) (codified as Chapter 23: "Civil Jus-
tice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans"). That act, inter alia, commanded each United
States district court, "in consultation with an advisory group," to consider "principles and
guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay reduction. . . ." Id. § 473(a). This
"bottom up," or grass roots, reform effort was to consider the following factors in com-
plex cases: "early and ongoing [court] control of the pretrial process"; means to encourage
"cost-effect discovery through voluntary exchange of information"; and "careful and delib-
erate monitoring through a discovery-case management conference or a series of such
conferences." Id. § 473(a)(l)-(4).
' At times the confederacy of large law firms is regional or national in scope. For
example, see, Ashland Oil, Inc.'s use of the large Pittsburgh firn of Kirkpatrick and
Lockhart to conduct an "independent" investigation of thinly disguised bribes Ashland paid
to obtain foreign oil. See NADER & SMrrH, supra note 1, at 52-59. An inter-city confed-
eracy of large law firms then came to Kirkpatrick's aid; power lawyers from Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson and from Arnold & Porter testified that the Kirkpatrick report
had been prepared with "professionalism and independence," id. at 55, even though jurors
remained unconvinced, one stating that the Kirkpatrick partner who testified was
"[a]bsolutely a liar." Id. at 57.
" Id. at 355 (arguing that disciplining a law firm for its individual lawyers' miscon-
duct will encourage firms to supervise the way its members handle cases). Indeed, that is
a remedy put in place several years before Nader and Smith wrote. In 1993, Congress
amended Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to permit sanctions against
law firms as well as against individual attorneys, reversing Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989). See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
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In the latter sphere, attorneys and courts supposedly substitute
reasoned discourse and argument for self-help, fisticuffs and ad
hominem attack. What Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provid-
ing for sanctioning (punishing) lawyers for frivolous court papers
or arguments, has shown us, however, is that too much opportunity
for punishing one's lawyer opponent has brought matters full cir-
cle. Lawyers now attack opposing lawyers rather than progressing
steadily toward solution of the underlying dispute between the
parties. In that manner, on a slightly different level, all of the
unseemly ad hominem attack the civil justice system seeks to avoid
has been reintroduced with a vengeance.
VI. STRUCrURAL CHANGE RATHER THAN REGULATION AND
PUNISHMENT AS A PRESCRIPTION
As Nader and Smith point out, state and federal judges have
to be more proactive. They must recognize naked and thinly veiled
SLAPP lawsuits for what they are, dismissing them at the earliest
opportunity. In certain categories of cases, judges must reverse
course, toward less rather than more due process, giving short
shrift to "Crush-em, Bash-em and Sanction-em" type Rule 11 mo-
tions or SLAPP lawsuits.
In the area of discovery abuse, Professor Charles Yablon has
recently written that perhaps the "best solution for lawyer miscon-
duct in discovery proceedings is the same one parents use when
their kids act up on long car trips-tell them to 'shut up and
knock it off,' preferably in a really loud voice."'49 He elaborates:
One problem with current law is that many judges are
reluctant to pull out the big strap of discovery sanctions
except when convinced that the lawyers involved are so
utterly recalcitrant that they deserve a serious whupping.
This piece suggests that a major improvement in the moral
education of litigators would be effected by increased sanc-
tioning of smaller, more annoying discovery abuses with
smaller, more annoying punishments. °
4 See NADER & SMIrrH, supra note 1, at 128-29 (stating that judges "must get
tough" in cases of discovery abuse); see also id. at 181 ("[J]udges will continue to play
a key role in preventing SLAPPs.").
4' Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1618, 1619 (1996).
'4 Id. at 1620.
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Proactive judicial attitudes go further toward curing the ills of the
civil justice system than other reforms proposed. For example,
means of alternative dispute resolution-mediation, mini-trial, rent-
a-judge5t -- have merely become additional obligatory steps on the
route to the courthouse. They represent yet another opportunity for
the lawyers Nader and Smith criticize to bill more hours in prepar-
ing and then attending the mediation. 2 By contrast, proactive pan-
els of judges who accept no nonsense and move all civil cases to
trial in one year or less may cause more cases to settle than all the
meditations and arbitrations in their district put together.
But what about structural change? As has been seen, increased
opportunity for punishing one's opponent has theoretical drawbacks.
Judges can be only so proactive, duty bound as they are to mete
out due process to all litigants and under the glare of the public
eye, in the form of journalists such as Nader and Smith, or their
opposite numbers, if they act too peremptorily.
VII. THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS AN
EXPERnvmNT THAT HAS FAILED
We need trials.53 Some public business must see the full light
of day. We do bargain in the shadow of the law,54 so we need
trials and appeals to produce law in whose shadow we can bargain.
But perhaps much of the root cause, pointing to a possible
5' See The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6)(B) (1994) (com-
manding each United States district court to consider local rules that would refer "appro-
priate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs that... the court may make avail-
able, including mediation, minitrial, and summary jury trial"). Experienced trial lawyers,
however, know that the best alternative dispute resolution mechanism is the certain pros-
pect of a trial in the near future.
5" Large law firms' billing practices are described as the "BUTS" principle in NADER
& SMITH, supra note 1, at 232-55. "BUTS" stands for "Bill Until They Squawk." Id. at
233.
53. For that reason, there has been a backlash to the headlong rush toward alternative
dispute resolution. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984).
' Professors Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser pointed this out in their seminal
piece Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, in which they dis-
cussed the private negotiations and bargaining that occurs outside of the courtroom in
divorce proceedings. See Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979); see also Robert Cooter et
al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (providing a mathematical analysis of the effectiveness of pretri-
al bargaining).
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structural solution, is the way we get there, that is, to a trial. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have created a system whereby
litigants no longer move in linear fashion toward the resolution of
the dispute between them. Instead, we have a system that has
created an opportunity for numerous "trials within trials."55 In
turn, that system favors the litigant who has the resources and can
stay the course which often happens to be the large corporation
and the sizeable law firm that represents it.
In litigation today we can have numerous motions, each with
supporting briefs, opposition briefs, and reply briefs, or with cross
motions, two of each kind of brief, that do little or nothing toward
moving the underlying dispute toward trial. 6 Thus, major battles
can be fought over motions to disqualify counsel, numerous mo-
tions and cross motions for sanctions, motions to compel discovery,
motions to seal the file, motions to certify the class, repeated mo-
tions to decertify the class, or to decertify subclasses, motions as to
the demand required in derivative litigation, and so on. Some per-
ceptive judges have observed this tendency to create litigation
within litigation.'
" As subtext, a related effort by the anti-plaintiff forces may be to create specialized
codes of civil procedure within civil procedure. They recently did so with the Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (Supp. I 1995), the thrust of which is
to create opportunities for "trials within trials" as, for example, in creation of ancillary
proceedings to determine the "most appropriate plaintiff" in securities class actions and to
conduct mandatory Rule 11 reviews of plaintiffs' pleadings. See generally Douglas M.
Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now Often Fatal,
Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 32-35
(1996); Douglas M. Branson, Chasing the Rogue Professional After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 50 SMU L. REv. 91, 114-15 (1996) (explaining the com-
plex and expensive procedures for providing notice to the "most appropriate plaintiff"
("MAP") in class litigation). We may expect to see future "reform" efforts to enact proce-
dural "add-ons" applicable to certain categories of cases.
' I have had counsel opine to me that not to file a cross motion, and have six
briefs rather than three, in their opinion may be malpractice.
" For example, see the comments of Judge Frank Easterbroolc "Mhe demand rule
[in shareholder derivative suits] creates more litigation than it prevents .... It is easy to
point to hundreds of cases, including this one, in which the demand requirement was
itself the center-piece of the litigation. An approach uncertain in scope and discretionary
in operation ... promotes litigation." Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338,
1342 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 500 U.S. 90 (1991). See also the comments of Delaware
Chancellor Brown commenting on the Special Litigation Committee procedure in share-
holder suits:
[The procedure] has the pragmatic effect of setting up a form of litigation
within litigation. (At this point in this case, we are some three years after the
amended complaint was filed, we have had three full-scale, briefed arguments,
we have had all of the investigation ... and as yet we have not reached the
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Even with dispositive motions (motions to dismiss, for judg-
ment on the pleadings, or for summary judgment), which do move
the dispute toward resolution, large law firms adopt what I term
the "salami" strategy. Rather than one or two motions, large law
firms slice up their arguments into numerous motions for partial
summary judgment. As to each, the weaker opponent has to gather
evidence, prepare counter affidavits, research and write an opposi-
tion brief, and perhaps prepare and deliver an oral argument.
I know that my thesis will be regarded as heresy and that
Judge Charles Clark, the father 6f the Federal Rules,58 would be
rolling in his grave were he to hear these sentiments, but I offer
one additional piece of evidence, albeit anecdotal.
In recent years, my consulting on corporate and securities law
matters has carried me into law firm offices and courts in New
York, Illinois, Alabama, Idaho, Alaska, Washington, Oregon and
Hawaii. The highest level of professionalism and the greatest
amount of civility I see among lawyers is in Oregon. And, guess
what? Of all those jurisdictions, Oregon is only one that has not
adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 9
Of course, the cause may be the laid-back lifestyle and good
health of Oregonians, the sylvan setting, the mild climate, the good
food and wine, and the frequent vision of snow capped mountains
in the Cascade range. I also suspect, though, that Oregon rules of
civil procedure permit fewer opportunities to engage in "litigation
within litigation." I certainly know that to be true with respect to
discovery.
In Oregon, opposing sides do not have to disclose who their
witnesses may be. To a degree, litigation is as of old, "litigation
by ambush," or the "sporting theory of justice," as Dean Roscoe
Pound termed it.' Opposing counsel does not know who the op-
point of any of the normal discovery and motion practice permitted by the
Court Rules).
Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 511 (Del. Ch. 1984), affd, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985).
S See, e.g., 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1004 (1987) (explaining that Judge Charles Clark, while Dean of Yale Law
School, was appointed as Reporter for the Advisory Committee that authored the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1935-38).
19. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIGESTS (1996) (State by State Compilation,
March 14, 1997, on file with author); see also Douglas M. Branson, The American Law
Institute Principles of Corporate Governance and the Derivative Action: A View from the
Other Side, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 399, 402 n.14 (1986) (comparing derivative litiga-
tion in Portland, Oregon or Portland, Maine with derivative litigation in Delaware or
under the American Law Institute proposals).
' Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
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posing side's expert is until the expert begins testimony. Upon
completion of direct examination, opposing counsel receives the
materials the expert reviewed with a long recess or lunch break to
prepare cross examination. In many ways, it is a more efficient
system. The cross examination is just as sharp and thorough as in
other jurisdictions. A side effect is much more civility among
members of the bar. The animosities that build up through protract-
ed discovery, with motions to compel, argument over scheduling
depositions, motions for sanctions, trails within trials, and the like
seem less extreme, or non-existent, in Oregon.61
VIII. CONCLUSION
I recommend Nader and Smith's No Contest. Those who read
this book will be perceptive enough to discount heavily the rheto-
ric, the re-cycled material, and the excessive alarmism.
As a prescription for what ails the civil justice system, howev-
er, I believe that thought has to go beyond demonization of corpo-
rations and their lawyers and calls for additional regulation and
punishment. My own prescription is to reexamine the federal rules
with a view toward minimizing opportunities the rules create for
"litigation within litigation," cross motions, "salami" tactics and
other stratagems that favor the stronger party. The goal of civil
justice reform must be to create a system in which the maximum
amount of resources possible are directed toward moving litigants'
disputes towards settlement or trial, and in which the opportunities
to create "sideshows" and "trials within trials" are minimized, if
not eliminated. Somehow I believe that Ralph Nader and Wesley J.
Smith would agree with me.
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
"L Cf. Abraham D. Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys of Discovery Abuse Under the New
Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 680, 696-97
(1983) (illustrating that as the number of discovery requests in a case rises to a high
level, the number of discovery disputes doubles, while in cases with little discovery, dis-
putes are nearly non-existent).
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